Oilpricechangeshasa greatinfluenceonthe behaviouroffirmsinoilexportingcountrieswhich displaysitselfinamountofnon-oiltaxreceiptsofthe statebudget.EmployingFMOLS,DOLS,andCCR cointegrationmethodsfor2001Q1 - 2015Q4,the studyaimstoanalysehowoilpricechangesaffects non-oiltaxrevenuesinAzerbaijan.Empiricalresultsaltogetherprovidestrongscientificevidence that there is U-shaped causality from oil price changes to total non-oil tax revenues , corporate incometaxreceiptsandlabourincometaxpayments,andinverseU-shapedtonon-oilVATrevenues of the state budget. Results show that firms face with the trade-off between "produce-and-sell" and"import-and-sell"asoilpricerises.Incaseofhigherpricethanthe thresholdlevel,companies preferthe latterchoice.Researchfindingsarehighlyusefulforthe publicpolicydecision-makersin resourcericheconomies.
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal dependence on natural resources in oil exporting economies is a crucial issue in the context of maintaining policy sustainability, especiallywhenvolatilityofoilpricesisconsidered.
Higheroilpricescausegovernmentsizetoincrease in the economy. Fiscal management is more challenging if the country has relatively weak non-oiltaxbase (ElAnshasyandBradley,2012) .
Cyclical economic impacts of oil price changes in oil-exporting countries mainly happens through fiscal policy (Husain et al., 2008) . Snudden (2016) arguesthatbudget-balancetax-gaprulesarebetter for stabilization of macroeconomic volatility in oil-exporting countries. Fiscal stance in a number of resource economies is highly sensitive to oil pricechanges.Hence,itaffectsdirectlythe amount of receipts from oil sector, indirectly through influencingbehaviourofnon-oilsectorparticipants. The relationship between oil price and economic growth is studied vastly within resource curse literature, there is no commonly revealed direction of the association (see Havranek et al. (2016) for the review of recent studies) which is also depend on institutional quality and other political interests (Kim, Wu and Lin, 2018; Horvath and Zeynalov, 2016; Klomp and Haan, 2016; Farhadi, Islam and Moslehi, 2015) . However, studies devoted to investigationofoilpricevolatility-budgetrevenues relationship is very limited (see Maji et al., 2017; Lorde et al., 2009; Reyes-Loya and Blanco, 2008) in which none attempted to examine U-shaped association. To our best knowledge, the association ofinterestisstudiedinMusayevandAliyev (2017) and Aliyev (2017) by employing cointegration methodsbutneitherinvestigatedU-shapedlink.
Thisstudyattemptstofillthe gapinthe resource curse literature. Here, existence of U-shaped long-run association between non-oil tax revenuesandoilpricechangesfora resourcerich country -Azerbaijan is empirically investigated. Here, the hypothesis is that higher oil price increasesnon-oiltaxreceipts,butwithdiminishing marginal returns and after the threshold level, the impact turns to be negative in an oil exporter due to deindustrialization impact within Dutch disease models as well as decreasing institutional quality (more tax evasion) in Nigerian disease frameworks. More precisely, higher oil price decreases competitiveness of local producers and makes import-and-sell more profitable than produce-and-sell. Oil price shocks increases economic uncertainty (Degiannakis et al., 2018) , and firm returns volatility (Narayan and Sharma, 2014) . On the other hand, government bodies become relatively less responsive to tax evasion attemptsinnon-oilsectorproducersintimeofhigh oilpricelevel.
For robustness, we apply Fully Modified Ordinary Lease Squares (hereafter FMOLS), DynamicOrdinaryLeastSquares(hereafterDOLS), and Canonical Cointegration Regression (hereafter CCR) methods to the data for 2000Q1 -2015Q4. The results have solid economic justification, and are highly useful for policy implications. Governmentofficialsshouldtakeintoconsideration long-run U-shaped impact of oil price changes whilemakingnon-oiltaxforecasts.
Background
As an oil exporting country, most of Azerbaijan statebudgetrevenuesisgeneratedbythe oilsector. AccordingtoStateOilFundofAzerbaijanRepublic (hereafter SOFAZ), of total state budget revenues, around 57 -58% directly transferred from SOFAZ within 2011 -2013 which has been decreased to 43.5% in 2016 43.5% in (SOFAZ, 2016 . Simultaneously, participation of oil sector is also substantially high ingenerationoftaxreceipts,directlyandindirectly.
Azerbaijan's oil boom period started at the end of 2005 when Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened to use accompanied with sharp oil production increase (Aliyev and Suleymanov, 2015) which strongly affected fiscal policy implementation of the country (Aliyev and Gasimov,2017) .
Of non-oil tax revenues, around 90% generated through Value Added Tax (hereafter VAT), labour incometax,andcorporateincometax.Thebiggest share belongs to VAT receipts which is followed by labour income tax (see Fig. 1 
Literature review
The relationship between fiscal policy implementation and oil price volatility has attracted attentionofscholarsina numberofstudies (Bollino, 2007; Pieschacon, 2009; Arezki and Ismail, 2013; Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy, 2010) . Oil price changes also matter for general macroeconomic situation.However,studiesinvestigatedthe impact of oil price changes over long-run economic growtharenotreconciled.Reviewof43empirical studies by Havranek et al. (2016) reveals finding negative influence (in 40% of studies), no relationship (in 40%), and positive association (in 20%).ÇatıkandÖnder(2013)revealsexistenceof parabolic relationship between oil price changes andeconomicactivity. Nusair(2016) hasexamined the association between oil price shocks and real total output for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Research concludes that "positive oil price changes have a considerably larger impact on real GDP than negative changes" (Nusair, 2016) . In case of Azerbaijan, employing various cointegration methods, do not find statistically significant long-run impact of oil priceandoilproductionovernon-oilsectoroutput while the models are controlled for the impact of budget expenditures and non-transfer budget revenues. Considering pass through influence of oil price changes over these two control variable, the resultmaynotshowceterisparibusimpact.
Higher oil prices means much more public spending financed by resource revenues which significantly affects performance of non-oil sector producers. Hamdi and Sbia (2013) employ multivariate cointegration analysis and error-correction model for 1960 -2010, conclude that oil revenues pass through government spending is the major source of growth in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The same path-through affect is also confirmed empirically in case of Azerbaijan in previous studies (see Dehning et al., 2016; AliyevandNadirov,2016; Hasanov,2013aamongothers) .
Ina numberofempiricalstudies,the relationship between oil price changes and tax revenues is investigated. In case of Trinidad and Tobago, Lorde et al.(2009) To our best knowledge, there are only two attempts - Musayev and Aliyev (2017) and Aliyev (2017) studying the impact of oil price changes overbudgetrevenues.Althoughbothstudiesreveal statistically and economically significant positive association, none display ceteris paribus impact over non-oil tax revenues. Thus, Musayev and Aliyev(2017) takenon-transferbudgetrevenuesas the proxyfortotaltaxreceiptswhichcoveralsotax payments from oil sector. Aliyev (2017) estimates elasticity of corporate income tax payments (total, from oil sector, and from non-oil sector) to oil price changes. While he reveals positive significant impact over total corporate income tax receipts as well as the amount received from oil sector whileno significant impact detected over non-oil corporate income tax payments. Because Aliyev (2017) estimate elasticity relationship for non-oil corporate income tax revenues, we argue that the model has functional misspecification shortcomingandresultsarenotunbiased.
Therefore,thisresearchfillsthe detectedserious gap in the oil price -tax revenues literature and claimforexistenceofU-shapedassociation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Data description
The research covers the period of 2000Q1 - 2015Q4.ConsumerPriceIndex(hereafter CPI)methodisusedtofindrealvalues.Descriptive statisticsofvariablesarepresentedinthe Tab. I.
Real total non-oil tax revenues (RNTR) represent total amount of tax receipts from non-oil sector producers and individuals, measured in million AZN. Quarterly data is obtained from Ministry of TaxesofAzerbaijanRepublic.
Real non-oil VAT revenue (VAT) is the amount of VAT receipts from non-oil sector, measured in millionAZN.SourceofdataisMinistryofTaxesof AzerbaijanRepublic.
Real non-oil corporate income tax revenues (CITR) stand for corporate income tax payments bynon-oilsectorlegalentities.Measuredinmillion AZN. Source: Ministry of Taxes of Azerbaijan Republic.
Real labour income tax revenues (LITR) displays the amount of labor income tax receipts from non-oilsectoremployers.MeasuredinmillionAZN. Source: MinistryofTaxesofAzerbaijanRepublic.
Real non-oil GDP (RNGDP) is total amount of output produced in non-oil sector of Azerbaijan economy, measured in million AZN. The data is publicly available in monthly statistical bulletins published by Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBAR) and in statistical reports of the State Statistical CommitteeofAzerbaijan.
Oil production (OPRN) indicates average daily oil production of Azerbaijan for each quarter, measured in thousands of barrels per day. The monthly data is retrieved from Trading Economics database and converted to quarterly frequency.
Oil price (OPRC) displays average price of one barrelofoilinthe worldmarket,measuredinUSD. Monthly data was obtained from the index mundi database, and converted to quarterly frequency by usingsimpleaveragemethod.
Estimation methodology
Employed theoretical and conceptual framework isdevelopedversionofMusayevandAliyev(2017). Theoretically, tax revenues are mainly determined by total output and tax rates. If we separate total output (Y t ) as oil (Y t ʹ) and non-oil (Y t ʺ) sectoral production, and show average tax rate with φ, then tax revenues (T t ) could be represented with followingfunction:
Note that t denotes the time, and
and daily average oil production (OPRN) amount andexpectedU-shapedimpactofoilprice,wecan writestaticelasticitymodelfunctionasbelow:
Here β stand for regression coeffcients, u is the stochastic error term. Unlike Musayev and Aliyev (2017) , we include quadratic form of "oil price" to the model in order to examine existence of U-shaped relationship. Remember that tax rates in Azerbaijan has been almost stable over the investigationperiod,includingthatasanother control variable is not required and supposed not tohaveanystrongimpact.Atleast,ithasnoimpact overoilpricechanges.Therefore,omittingtaxrate If equation (2) is estimated, it is very easy to calculate threshold level of oil price at which the direction of impact is expected to change. To make it even much more easy, it is better to substitute ln(oprc) t = X and find derivative of the estimated equation according to X. At the thresholdlevel,marginalimpactofoilpriceis zero.Therefore,weshouldcalculatethe valueofX fromthe equation,givenbelow:
Finally,wecanobtainthresholdlevelofoilprice byfindingantilogofX.Usingexponentialfunction inExcel:
If the relationship is U-shaped, β 2 is expected to benegativeandviceversa.Weexpectthatβ 1 and β 2 willbestatisticallysignificant(p < 0.05).
Primary focus of this paper is to investigate the direction of long-run association between oil pricechangesandnon-oiltaxrevenues.Therefore, cointegration techniques are employed. For robustness of empirical results, three different cointegrationmethodsareused.TheseareFMOLS, DOLSandCCR.
Each method has different advantages which makes estimated results more reliable. FMOLS, developed by Philips and Hansen (1990) corrects endogeneity and serial correlation effects while DOLS,advocatedbyStockandWatson(1993),allows estimatinglong-runequilibriumwhichiscorrected for potential simultaneity bias among explanatory variables (NarayanandNarayan,2004) .Developed byPark(1992),CCRleadstoobtainasymptotically efficient estimators by employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). To conserve the space, we do not discuss technical details of the methods. Existence of long-run association in estimated equations is examined by using Engle-Granger (Engel and Granger, 1987) and Philips-Ouliaris (Philips and Ouilaris,1990)cointegrationtests.
In a time series analysis, determining order of integration of employed series is a pre-condition before estimating cointegration equations. To obtain more reliable results, here, we employ Augmented Dickey Fuller (hereafter ADF), the Phillips-Perron (hereafter PP), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (hereafter KPSS) unit root tests. Note that ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1984) and PP (Philips and Perron, 1988) tests the null hypothesis of "there is unit root problem" while the null hypothesis in KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al..,1992) is"seriesarestationary". To account for trend stationarity, the problem is tested with intercept, and with trend and intercept, separately.
Because production may exhibit seasonality problem and this can influence tax payments, we have included seasonal dummies to all models except labor income tax model as the wages are seasonally changeable and seasonal jobs do not takesubstantialroleintaxpayments.
RESULTS
Unit root test results
This sub-section covers discussion of the results obtained from ADF, PP, and KPSS unit root test resultswithintercept,andwithtrendandintercept.
Unit root test results from all tests support each other.Withouttrend,ADF,PP,andKPSSrevealthat allvariablesarenon-stationaryatlevel.However, firstdifferenceddataisstationary5%significance level for all variables (p value < 0.05).Inotherwords, allvariablesareintegratedoforderoneof I(1).
Including trend to the test equations does not strongly affect ADF outputs, again all variables are non-stationary at level, but stationary at first difference or I(1).However, PP finds RNTR, VAT, CITR, and RNGDP trend-stationary at level. KPSS producemixedresults.
Because we will not include trend variable to the models, taking unit root test results with only intercept should not have any significant impact overestimationofcointegrationequations.Hence, wedecidethatallvariablesareI(1).SothatFMOLS, DOLS,andCCRcanbeapplied.
Estimating polynomial cointegration equations
To determine if there is cointegration among the variables in estimated models by FMOLS, DOLSandCCR,Engle-GrangerandPhillips-Ouliaris cointegration tests are applied. Results are tabulatedinTab. III.
Both cointegration tests provide strong evidence for existence of long-run association among variables in all models regardless the estimation method. Null hypothesis of "series are not cointegrated"isrejectedat5%levelofsignificance Here, it is noteworthy once more to mention that our hypothesis is about existence of parabolic relationship between oil price and tax revenues.
In other words, we expect diminishing marginal returns of oil price increase for non-oil tax revenues.
Note that oil production, non-oil GDP and seasonal dummies are included only for controlling purposes. Their coefficients are economically and statisticallymeaningful.
Therefore, our focus is the sign and statistical significanceofthe coefficients'ofoilprice.Results are robust and highly reliable as all employed (oprc) 2 is always statistically significant. Except Panel B, its coefficient is negative which means diminishing marginal returns of oil price increase to corresponding category of non-oil tax revenues. Mathematically, this can be proven by finding secondderivativeofeachmodeltoln (oprc).
IV: Results of long-run estimations
However, in Panel B, coefficient of ln (oprc) 2 is positive. Therefore, finding second derivative of this model to ln (oprc) will provide a positive number. More precisely, increasing marginal returnsofoilpriceincreasetoVATpaymentsfrom the non-oil sector is found. Actually, this is not contradictory to our expectations. Reasoning will bediscussedinthe nextsection. Consequently, our hypotheses is confirmed by estimation results. Now, the question is what is the threshold level of oil price for each defined category of non-oil tax revenues? Applying equation3 - 4tothe estimatedmodelswillprovide threshold level of oil price. The calculations are doneandtabulatedinTab. V. ThresholdlevelofoilpricefromFMOLSandCCR are very close to each other while DOLS output varies around these values. According to FMOLS and CCR, threshold level of oil price for total non-oil tax revenues is around 69 USD while it is 80 - 82USDforVATpayments,67USDforcorporate income tax receipts, and 79 - 80 USD for labor incometaxearnings.
Although DOLS estimators are substantially different for three non-oil tax revenue categories, this is quite plausible and should not decrease the robustness of the research findings. The differenceisonlyinmagnitudeofcoefficients, not in the direction or statistical significance of the relationship.
DISCUSSION
Expanding non-oil tax base and maintaining fiscal stability / sustainability is increasing its priority in Azerbaijan economic policy. In 2016, the president Ilham Aliyev approved "Strategic Road Map" of Azerbaijan Republic, of which one of major directions is to strengthen fiscal sustainabilityofthe statebudget.Notethatallthese reform attempts are initiated during and after 2015whenoilpricesharplyfellandconsequently national currency was devalued 2 times against USDwithinoneyear -by33percentonFebruary 21 (CBAR,2015 ),andby47.6percentonDecember 21, 2015 (CBAR, 2015 . Devaluations have also substantial impact over tax revenues (Jenkins et al.., 2000andMusayevandAliyev,2016 .
On the other hand, the major source of budget revenues -SOFAZ assets are limited (currently 36 billionUSD),andbyOctober2017,directtransfers tothe statebudgetamounts75.8billionAZN(44.59 billionUSD,1 USD = 1.70AZN)(http: / / www.oilfund. az / az_AZ / hesabatlar-ve-statistika / son-reqemler. asp). Financing by transfers cannot last so long. Because this is already in the agenda of top government officials, the president has given tax related messages such as "business people should be responsible and pay taxes in full" (http: / / en. president.az / articles / 17693), "the Ministry of Taxes should try to ensure that taxpayers pay taxeslegitimatelyandinfull"(http: / / en.president. az / articles / 16219) , and "we need to move the informaleconomicactivityintothe legalplane" to broaden the tax base (http: / / en.president. az / articles / 17442).
From this point of view, the importance of non-oil sector in budget revenues will increase, and precise forecasting of non-oil tax revenues paralleltooilpricechangesisofgreatimportance. Thisindicatesthe practicalusefulnessofthisstudy.
Empirical results are substantially reliable and economically interpretable as well as support Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Buiter and Purvis, 1983; Corden, 1984; Edwards, 1985) . It is expected that resource boom leads to direct and indirect de-industrialization, more precisely, movement of labor from non-booming tradable sector to the booming sector as well as to non-tradable sector of the economy (Hasanov, 2013b) .Therearea numberofstudiedinvestigated Dutch Disease symptoms in Azerbaijan economy (Kronenberg, 2004; Gahramanov and Fan, 2002; Egert, 2009) . Institutional aspects of the issue are more complicated. Empirical studies show that the quality of institutions in resource rich economies determines the impact of natural resources (HorvathandZeynalov,2016) .
Therefore,highoilpricesmaycrowd-outnon-oil domestic production especially if the institutional quality is lower. In this case, companies may be encouraged to import-and-sell instead of producinginthe countryifthisismoreprofitable. Consequently, this will have certain impact over non-oiltaxrevenues.Thatiswhyfoundthreshold price level (69 USD) for total real non-oil tax revenuesisquiteunderstandable.
Threshold price levels for VAT, CITR, and LITR strongly supports the economic reasoning about crowding out effect. Note that for CITR, the price level is around 67 USD while it is approximately 79-80 USD for both VAT and LITR. Oil price level of 67-79 USD is decision making area for corporate income tax payers: to produce-and-sell orimport-and-sell.
Asthe priceincreasesfurther,companiesprefer the latter choice which leads to less demand for labor force, and consequently less labor income tax payments, more import-and-sell policy, and relatively more VAT receipts. In Azerbaijan Tax Code, most small and medium non-oil sector producers are Simplified Tax payers or they pay a certain portion of the total turnover regardless the costs: 4%forthoseinBaku,and2%forthe tax payersinthe regions.Therefore,VATpaymentson importedproductsarenotsubstitutedafterthe sale in domestic market. That is why finding inverse U-shapedassociationrepresentsthe realsituation.
About institutional aspects, one should take into consideration the level of tax control vs oil price changes in a resource rich country. State budget shouldhavenochallengesincaseofhighoilprices. Resource revenues are easy gained and transfers based spending do not hurt voters. So that, tax control is expected to be lower if oil price is higher than a certain level. This reminds the issue of institutional quality. Quotations from the speech of President mentioned above also provide some evidence about weak tax control and high tax evasions before 2015 accompanied by high oil price tendency. Meanwhile, observations clearly show the level of struggle against tax evasions by MinistryofTaxesofAzerbaijanrepublicespecially after 2015. Unfortunately, statistics of tax controls and punishments are not publicly available. Tax revenue classification as oil-and-non-oil sector is notalsoreportedforpost2015periodwhichdoes notallowincludingintoempiricalestimations.
CONCLUSION
Thisresearchaimedtoestimatethe relationshipbetweentaxrevenuesfromnon-oilsectorandoil pricechangesina resourcerichcountry -Azerbaijan.Notethatthe countryhasrichoilrevenues andsince2005enjoysoilboom.However,oilisanexhaustedsourceofrevenues.Sothateconomic policymakersshouldfocusonexpandingnon-oiltaxbaseinordertomaintainfiscalsustainability inthe long-run.However,non-oiltaxrevenuesarealsodependonoilpricechangesatsomelevel whichhassolideconomicinterpretationinthe contextofDutchDiseasetheoryaswellasinstitutional aspectsofresourcecurse. Thestudyusesquarterlydatafor2000 -2015periodandestimatethe impactofoilpricechanges overtotalnon-oiltaxrevenuesaswellascorporateincometaxpayments,laborincometaxreceipts andVATrevenuesfromnon-oilsector,separately.The hypothesiswasaboutexistenceofU-shaped orparabolicassociationwhichisthe realnoveltyofthisinvestigation.Threedifferentcointegration methods -FMOLS,DOLS,andCCRareemployedinordertoobtainmorerobustresults. Empiricalresultsabsolutelysupportedourhypotheseswithoutanysignificantdistinctionaccording toemployedcointegrationtechniques.Itisrevealedthatlong-runassociationexistsbetweenoilprice changesandnon-oiltaxrevenues.The thresholdlevelofoilpricefortotalrealnon-oiltaxrevenues isapproximately69USDwhileitisaround79-80USDforVATandlaborincometaxreceipts,and nearly67USDforcorporateincometaxpayments. Overallconclusionisthathigheroilprices(morethan67 -69USD)discourageandmakedomestic production less profitable, and stimulate companies to import and sell. Finding inverse U-shaped associationforVATrevenuesandU-shapedforcorporateincometaxandlaborincometaxreceipts strongly supports "import-and-sell" argument. Especially, the scientific empirical evidence that threshold level for VAT and labor income tax revenues are almost the same allows no doubt on robustnessofempiricalresultsandpracticalusefulnessofthe study. Inlightofproducedscientificknowledge,itisrecommendedthatpolicymakersinAzerbaijanshould takeintoconsiderationexistenceofparabolicassociationbetweenoilpriceandnon-oiltaxpayments whilemakingtaxforecasts. Stablecontrol over tax evasions shouldbe maintained. In time of highoilprice levels, from local productiontoimport-and-selltransitionhappens.However,whenoilpricesharplyfalls,the reverse does not realize immediately. Hence, more severe tax control and punishments may discourage domesticproductionevenfurtherandleadtodelayingofthisreturn. Forecastingtaxrevenuesandmaintainsustainabilityoffiscalpolicyisa keychallengeforresource richeconomiesduetovolatilityincommodityprices.Whennaturalresourcepricefalls,governments concentrate on expanding non-resource tax base or increase the amount of tax revenues from non-resource sector which is found to be also strongly elastic to oil prices in case of Azerbaijan. Therefore,the researchshouldstimulatescholarsandresearchersingovernanceinstitutestoexamine the relationshipbetweennaturalresourcepricechangesandtaxrevenuesfromnon-resourcesector.
